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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1102
______
ISAIAS BELTRE MATOS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
___________
On Petition for Review of a
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A079-739-512)
Immigration Judge: Matthew Watters
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 15, 2021
___________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 27, 2022)
___________
OPINION*
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.
While he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, Isaias Beltre
Matos, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, worked with others to buy and
sell personally identifiable information belonging to United States citizens. That
information was sold in sets consisting of Puerto Rican birth certificates and
corresponding social security cards, as well as other identification documents, including
driver’s licenses and voter registration cards. With those documents, a non-citizen could
assume the identity of a United States citizen, and over 100 non-citizens within the
United States bought those document sets. For his role in that scheme, Beltre Matos
pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, conspiracy to encourage an alien to reside in the
United States for financial gain, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), among other related
crimes, and he was sentenced to fifty-one months’ imprisonment.
Due to that conviction, the Department of Homeland Security commenced
removal proceedings against Beltre Matos. An Immigration Judge determined that Beltre
Matos’s crime constituted an aggravated felony and, on that basis, ordered his removal.
That order also caused Beltre Matos to lose his status as a lawful permanent resident. In
addition, the Immigration Judge ruled that Beltre Matos’s conduct constituted alien
smuggling, and that rendered Beltre Matos ineligible to regain his status as a lawful
permanent resident. Beltre Matos administratively appealed that order, and the Board of
Immigration Appeals adopted the Immigration Judge’s conclusions.
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Through a timely petition, Beltre Matos invoked this Court’s jurisdiction to review
two legal conclusions in the final order: that his conviction constitutes an aggravated
felony and that his underlying conduct qualifies as alien smuggling. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (preserving jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims” and “questions
of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals”). In
reviewing those conclusions de novo, see Patel v. Att’y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir.
2010), the first is correct (because Beltre Matos’s crime constitutes an aggravated
felony), but the second is not (because his conduct falls outside of the statutory definition
of “alien smuggling,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i)). Accordingly, we will deny the
petition in part, grant the petition in part, and remand to the agency so that it may
consider Beltre Matos’s adjustment-of-status application.
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Non-citizens, including lawful permanent residents, who are convicted of a
statutorily defined “aggravated felony”1 are subject to a string of cascading deportation
consequences. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010) (noting that
aggravated felons are “singled out for the harshest deportation consequences”). Such a
person not only becomes deportable2 but also loses the ability to seek several forms of
relief from deportation, such as asylum, cancellation of removal, and depending on the

1

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (specifying certain crimes as aggravated felonies).

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony
at any time after admission is deportable.”).
2
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length of the sentence, statutory withholding of removal.3 See Singh v. Att’y Gen.,
839 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2016). And a non-citizen with lawful-permanent-resident
status loses that status if ordered deported or removed.4
But not every aggravated-felony conviction affects a non-citizen’s admissibility.
See Parra-Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 747 F.3d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 2014). Rather, a non-citizen
becomes inadmissible as a result of committing certain criminal offenses5 or violating
certain immigration laws, including the prohibition on alien smuggling.6 An inadmissible
non-citizen is ineligible for adjustment of status to that of lawful permanent resident.7
Critically, however, a non-citizen who has committed an aggravated felony but who
remains admissible and otherwise meets the eligibility requirements for an adjustment of
status8 may apply to adjust his or her status to that of a lawful permanent resident – even

3

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (precluding asylum for aliens who have been
convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” which includes aggravated felonies); id.
§ 1229b(a)(3) (providing that conviction for “any aggravated felony” renders aliens
ineligible for cancellation of removal); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that an alien
convicted of one or more aggravated felonies with an aggregate prison sentence of at
least five years is barred from seeking withholding of removal).
See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p) (providing that a lawful-permanent-resident status “terminates
upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion, deportation, removal, or
recission”).
4

5

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crimes of moral turpitude), (II) (drug crimes).

6

See id. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).

7

See id. § 1255(a) (providing that any inadmissible alien is ineligible for an adjustment
of status).
8

See id. (providing that an adjustment of status may be granted in the discretion of the
Attorney General to aliens who are eligible to receive an immigrant visa and are
“admissible to the United States for permanent residence”).
4

if he or she is subject to a final order of removal. See Parra-Rojas, 747 F.3d at 166, 172.
The ultimate decision to grant an adjustment of status rests in the exercise of the Attorney
General’s discretion.9
II. DISCUSSION
During his removal proceedings, Beltre Matos, who proceeded pro se, addressed
the consequences that his conviction had on his removability and admissibility. He
argued that his crime did not constitute an aggravated felony. He also indicated an
intention to apply for an adjustment of status in case he was ordered removed and lost
status as a lawful permanent resident as a result. He further explained that his wife – who
is a U.S. citizen – began that adjustment-of-status process by filing an I-130 Form on his
behalf. The Immigration Judge, and later the BIA, rejected both of Beltre Matos’s efforts
by concluding that (i) his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and (ii) he was
ineligible for adjustment of status because his conduct constituted alien smuggling, which
rendered him inadmissible.
A. Beltre Matos’s Conviction Qualifies as an Aggravated Felony.
In general, the crime of conspiring to encourage a non-citizen to reside in the
United States for financial gain under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) constitutes an aggravated
felony. As statutorily defined, the term “aggravated felony” expressly cross-references
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A):

See id.; Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 109 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the final
decision to adjust status is left to the discretion of the Attorney General”).
9
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[A]n offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this
title (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for
which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the
offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s
spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of
this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N). The term “aggravated felony” also includes a “conspiracy to
commit an offense described in this paragraph.” See id. § 1101(a)(43)(U). Thus, the
general rule is that the crime of conspiring to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) constitutes
an aggravated felony, subject to a limited exception for first-time offenders who conspire
to sell identity documents to a spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual). See id.
§ 1101(a)(43)(N), (U). Applying those principles here, because Beltre Matos offers no
proof that the exception applies, his conviction for conspiracy to violate § 1324(a)(1)(A)
qualifies as an aggravated felony.
Beltre Matos challenges that outcome and offers an alternative reading of the
immigration statute. He contends that the parenthetical in § 1101(a)(43)(N), “relating to
alien smuggling,” means that only violations of § 1324(a)(1)(A) related to alien
smuggling constitute aggravated felonies. And because he did not smuggle aliens, Beltre
Matos submits that his § 1324(a)(1)(A) conviction cannot be for an aggravated felony.
But this Court has already considered and precedentially rejected that construction. In
response to the same argument, this Court held that the parenthetical in § 1101(a)(43)(N)
does not narrow the qualifying offenses in § 1324(a)(1)(A) but rather “is descriptive of all
of the offenses contained in” § 1324(a)(1)(A). Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 473 (3d
Cir. 2002).
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Thus, due to his conviction, Beltre Matos is removable as an aggravated felon.
And by regulation, the final order subjecting him to removal strips him of his status as a
lawful permanent resident. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p).
B. Beltre Matos’s Underlying Conduct Does Not Constitute Alien Smuggling.
The so-called ‘smuggling bar’ prevents a non-citizen from adjusting his status.
A non-citizen becomes inadmissible by knowingly encouraging, inducing, assisting,
abetting, or aiding any other non-citizen “to enter or to try to enter the United States in
violation of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (emphasis added). And an inadmissible
non-citizen is ineligible for a discretionary adjustment of status. See id. § 1255(a). The
application of the smuggling bar depends on the non-citizen’s “underlying conduct,” not
any specific conviction. Parra-Rojas, 747 F.3d at 168–69.
The Immigration Judge misapplied the smuggling bar to Beltre Matos. The
smuggling bar applies to aliens who knowingly assist, induce, or encourage another alien
to cross the border into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). But Beltre
Matos’s underlying conduct involved providing identity documents to aliens already
residing in the United States – not to those outside of the United States. Because his
underlying conduct does not constitute alien smuggling, the smuggling bar does not
preclude his application for an adjustment of status.
***
In sum, we will (i) partially deny Beltre Matos’s petition (because the order to
remove Beltre Matos was correct as a matter of law), and (ii) partially grant his petition
to vacate the order’s improper application of the smuggling bar and remand this matter to
7

the agency to consider Beltre Matos’s adjustment-of-status application, the resolution of
which rests in the discretion of the Attorney General.
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